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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
perform struck work, or bargain for a contract clause exempting super-
visors from union discipline for performance of such struck work.'
0 2
The language of the Supreme Court in its recent decision in NLRB v.
Boeing Co. 10 3 is relevant to a resolution of the issues involved in the
Electrical Workers cases:
While "unreasonable" fines may be more coercive than "reasonable"
fines, all fines are coercive to a greater or lesser degree. The under-
lying basis for the holdings of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield was not
that reasonable fines were non-coercive under the language of §8(b)
(1) (A), but was instead that those provisions were not intended by
Congress to apply to the imposition by the union of fines not affecting
the employer-employee relationship and not otherwise prohibited by
the Act.10 4
Section 8(b) (1) (B) similarly does not appear to have been intended by
Congress to apply to union discipline which does not restrain or coerce
an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances. Such a reading of
the congressional intent is consistent with the Act's policy of allowing a
union to protect its status during a strike.
Section 8(b) (1) (B) itself cannot be read to prohibit discipline of
supervisor-members for performance of rank-and-file work during a lawful
economic strike. The Seventh Circuit decision expands section 8 (b) (1) (B)
beyond its purpose. The rule of the District of Columbia Circuit should
prevail.
Richard J. Conn
SECURITIES - OUTSIDERS WHO TRADE ON INSIDE INFORMATION
HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE CORPORATION FOR THEIR PROFITS ON
THE BASIS OF COMMON LAw FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES.
Schein v. Chasen (2d Cir. 1973)
Invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiffs brought
shareholders' derivative actions on behalf of Lum's, Inc. (Lum's), a Florida
corporation engaged in the restaurant franchising business, alleging that
the defendants were jointly and severally liable under state corporation law
102. See Gould, supra note 74, at 1129.
103. 93 S. Ct. 1952 (1973).
104. Id. at 1956.
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for profits realized by two mutual funds which had traded in Lum's stock
on the basis of confidential corporate information.' No violation of federal
securities laws was alleged. 2
The complaint made the following allegations. In November 1969,
Chasen, the president of Lum's, disclosed to the financial community that
the corporate earnings for the fiscal year would be approximately $1.00 per
share. On January 5, 1970, Chasen learned that this projection was overly
optimistic and that a more realistic estimate would be $.76 per share.
Instead of immediately announcing this fact to the public, Chasen disclosed
the information to Simon, a registered representative of Lehman Brothers,
who, while aware that the information had not been released to the public,
in turn, telephoned the information to Sit, an employee of Investors Diver-
sified Services, Inc. (IDS). Sit immediately relayed the information to
Jundt, another employee of IDS. Sit and Jundt managed stock portfolios
of the mutual funds, Investors Variable Payment Fund, Inc. (Investors)
and IDS New Dimensions Fund, Inc. (Dimensions). The next morning,
before any public disclosure of the reduced projected earnings, the two
mutual funds, which held 83,000 shares of Lum's, sold all their stock. The
sales were executed on the New York Stock Exchange at a price of approx-
imately $17.50 per share.3 That afternoon, the Exchange halted further
trading in Lum's stock pending a company announcement, and later that
day Lum's publicly revealed the new earnings forecast. When trading in
Lum's was resumed on the next business day, volume was heavy and the
stock closed at a price $3.50 per share lower than that realized by the
mutual funds.
The plaintiffs' complaints named Chasen, Simon, Sit, Jundt, Lehman
Brothers, IDS, and the two IDS mutual funds (Dimensions and Investors)
as defendants. The district court granted motions to dismiss by Sit, Jundt,
and Chasen pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure on the ground that personal jurisdiction was not properly obtained
under the New York long arm statute. 4 Holding that Florida state law
was the proper substantive law to apply, 5 the court further dismissed the
1. Three actions were consolidated in the district court: Gildenhorn v. Lum's,
Inc., Gregorio v. Lum's, Inc., and Schein v. Chasen. The district court's opinion is
reported as Gildenhorn v. Lum's, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
2. Id. at 332.
3. Significantly, neither Lehman Brothers nor Simon traded for their own
accounts. Id.
4. Id. at 331 n.1 & 335. As it was a diversity action, personal jurisdiction over
the defendants was determined by New York law pursuant to Rule 4(d) (7) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 334. The New York Long Arm Statute is
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 302(a) (McKinney 1963). Requirements for valid out of state
service of process are contained in N.Y. CiV. PRAc. § 313 (McKinney 1963).
5. 335 F. Supp. at 332-33. The court considered several choice of law tests and
determined that each test dictated the application of Florida law. This determination
was not challenged on appeal.
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complaints against Simon, Lehman Brothers, IDS, and the two IDS mutual
funds for failure to state a cause of action under Florida law.0
On appeal, a divided Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of the
suits against defendants Lehman Brothers, Simon, IDS, and the two IDS
mutual funds,7 holding that on the basis of common law fiduciary principles
a derivative suit for the benefit of the corporation may be sustained against
outsiders who trade on inside information s and that the scope of that
liability extended even to intermediary tippees (i.e Simon and Lehman
Brothers) who did not trade on the inside information but merely passed
it on to others who did.9 Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 568 (1973).
In a forceful dissent, Judge Kaufman characterized the court's reason-
ing as "a distortion of the law of agency and the law of fiduciary responsi-
bility."' 1 While agreeing with the majority's objective of providing a
disincentive to insider trading, he vigorously challenged the means em-
ployed, believing that the federal securities laws provided a more appro-
priate vehicle for an attack upon the defendant's conduct."
As Judge Kaufman stated, "[I]t is no longer debatable that trading
on inside information merits universal condemnation.' 2  Recent years
have seen innovative applications of the federal securities laws - most
notably sections 10(b) and 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and rule 10b-5 as promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
- make trading on confidential corporate information an extremely
hazardous activity.' 3 However, as noted previously, the plaintiff share-
6. Id. at 334. In refusing to extend the rationale of Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24
N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 401 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), to cover the instant case, Judge
Tyler stated:
[T]he New York Court of Appeals [in Diamond] held that a corporate fiduciary
is liable for profits which he realizes from a sale of stock motivated by inside
information received by him in his corporate position. None of the defendants
in these actions fit into this mold.
335 F. Supp. at 333.
7. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Lehman
Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 568 (1973). Plaintiff-appellants did not appeal the district
court order dismissing the actions against Chasen, Sit, and Jundt. Although Simon
filed a similar motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the district court
did not rule on it. Because the trial court had not reached this question, the Court
of Appeals declined to address it on appeal. Id. at 819 n.1.
8. Id. at 822. Judge Waterman, writing for the majority, stated:
[I]t is immaterial . . . whether the director trades on his own account in the
corporation's stock or whether he passes on the information to outsiders who then
trade in the corporation's stock.
Id.
9. Id. at 824. The court stated:
[W]e fail to see how equity would be furthered by imposing liability only on
the Funds and not on the other participants who supplied the Funds with the
inside information.
Id.
10. Id. at 825 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 827 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 825 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). But see H. MANNa, INsIDER TRADING
AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
13. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
af'd in part, re7Id in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005, reh.
denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1971).
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holders in Schein did not base their claim on any federally created right.
Instead, their action took the form of a common law derivative suit on
behalf of the corporation. 1' Only because of the accident of diversity was
the suit brought in federal court.
It has long been recognized at common law that a corporation is owed
fiduciary obligations by its directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.' 5
These duties have been described as both "loyalty and allegiance to the
corporation - a loyalty that is undivided and an allegiance that is influenced
in action by no consideration other than the welfare of the corporation.' 6
This duty of undivided loyalty prohibits corporate fiduciaries from com-
peting with the corporation in any way, including the usurpation of cor-
porate opportunities for personal use' 7 and participation in transactions
when the corporate interest conflicts with and is subordinated to an interest
of the fiduciary.' 8
The courts, however, have been reluctant to apply these common law
fiduciary principles to the area of insider trading in corporate securities. 19
Originally, most courts took the position that, absent fraud or misrepre-
sentation, a corporate fiduciary could deal freely in shares of his corpora-
14. The shareholder's derivative action developed from equity. Courts realized
that existing legal remedies to protect minority shareholders were inadequate when
the corporation was wronged and those who controlled the corporation refused to
sue on its behalf. The derivative suit gives the shareholder the power to "deriva-
tively" enforce a corporation right, indirectly protecting his own interest in the cor-
poration as well as the interests of the creditors and other shareholders. Since the
suit is not brought for the benefit of the shareholder but rather on behalf of the
corporation, any recovery goes into the corporate treasury. See H. HENN, LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 358 (2d ed. 1970).
The American genesis of the shareholder's derivative suit is usually con-
sidered to be the early New York case, Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. *222, 24
Am. Dec. 212 (N.Y. 1832), but dicta in support of the theory of management's
accountability to the suits of minority stockholders is found as far back as 1817 in
Chancellor Kent's opinion in Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. *371,
*389-90 (N.Y. 1817). In 1855, the United States Supreme Court placed its im-
primatur on the shareholder's right to redress in a derivative suit in Dodge v. Woolsey,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). See Hornstein, The Shareholder's Derivative Suj
in the United States, 1967 J. Bus. L. 282; Prunty, The Shareholders Derivative Suit:
Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 980 (1957).
15. See W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838(perm. ed. 1965).
16. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 667-68 (Sup. Ct. 1940), quoted in HENN,
supra note 14, at § 235.
17. See, e.g., Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Kassab, 325 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1963);
Zampetti v. Cavanaugh, 406 Pa. 259, 176 A.2d 906 (1962). See generally HENN,
supra note 14, at § 237; 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 127.06 (1972);
Slaughter, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 18 Sw. L.J. 96 (1964); Wadmond,
Seizure of Corporate Opportunity, 17 Bus. LAW. 63 (1961).
18. See CAVITCH, supra note 17, at § 127.06. See generally Prochnow, Conflict
of Interest and the Corporate Trustee, 22 Bus. LAW. 929 (1967) ; Davis, Conflicts
of Interest between Corporations and Their Directors, Officers, Employees and Agents,
8 ROCKY MT. M.L. INST. 191 (1963).
19. The inadequacy of the common law in the area of securities trading has long
been recognized and led to the passage of the federal securities laws. Hearings held
prior to the promulgation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj(1971), disclosed that one of the principal causes of the collapse of investor confidence
in the securities market was trading by insiders on confidential corporate information.
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934).
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tion.2 0 Gradually, however, courts began to recognize that "special facts"
could justify the imposition on directors or officers of a fiduciary duty to
disclose inside information to the individual shareholders with whom they
traded. 21 Eventually, a "minority rule" evolved under which corporate
insiders were held to a fiduciary duty to prospective buyers and sellers
regardless of the "special facts" involved. 22 However, even with the
so-called "minority rule", insider trading by corporate fiduciaries was not
normally viewed as a violation of fiduciary duty with respect to the cor-
poration - only as to the purchasing or selling shareholder.23 Although
a number of cases purported to acknowledge the existence of a fiduciary
duty running to the corporation, close analysis of the decisions reveals
that evidence of either corporate opportunity usurpation, conflict of in-
terest, use of corporate funds, competition with the corporation or other
corporate injury was present.24
The first real indication of judicial willingness to establish a definitive
common law fiduciary relationship between the inside trader and the
corporation was found in Brophy v. Cities Service Co. 25 In Brophy, a
shareholder's derivative action under Delaware law was brought against
an employee of a corporation who, by reason of his employment, had
learned of the corporation's intention to purchase its own stock in quan-
tities sufficient to cause a rise in the market price. He bought shares
before the corporation's purchase and thereafter sold them at a profit.
20. See, e.g., Chatz v. Midco Oil Corp., 152 F.2d 153, 155 (7th Cir. 1945). The
rationale was that the corporate fiduciary's shares were personal property and his
dealings in personal securities could not be viewed as corporate transactions. There-
fore, no violation of any fiduciary duty owed the corporation was involved. See
generally CAVITCH, supra note 17, at § 127.07[1]. The absence of a recognized
fiduciary relationship between the inside trader and the purchasing or selling share-
holder was an application of the traditional common law doctrine of caveat emptor.
See 1970 Wis. L. REv. 576, 577.
21. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), where the principles of this
doctrine were first articulated. See also N. LATtIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 81
(2d ed. 1971).
22. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1962);
Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932). But even under the "minority
rule," liability attaches only when it can be shown that the shareholder relied on the
non-disclosure. See HENN, supra note 14, at § 239. In Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass.
358, 106 N.E. 659 (1933), such reliance was deemed lacking when the transaction took
place on a securities exchange.
23. See Stephen v. Hale-Hass Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 620 (1946).
24. See, e.g., Pratt v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 659 (1939) (conflict of interest); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del.
Ch. 138, 2 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1938), aff'd 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939)(appropriation of business opportunity); Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White
Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 66 S.W.2d 889 (1933) (use of corporate funds); Byrne v.
Barrett, 268 N.Y. 199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935) (appropriation of a business opportunity).
In these cases the courts' focus was on determining whether the manner in which
the confidential corporate information was used breached a fiduciary duty rather than
whether the use of inside information per se constituted a breach. But cf. Louisiana
Mortgage Corp. v. Pickens, 167 So. 914 (La. App. 1936) (president of corporation
could be required to account to corporation for profits derived from disclosing in-
formation concerning corporate assets to a judgment creditor of the corporation not-
withstanding that the disclosure caused no damage to the corporation).
25. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949), noted in 63 HAuv. L. REv. 1446 (1949).
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In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action, the court held that the employee, by virtue of his having obtained
such confidential corporate information, occupied a position of trust with
respect to the corporation analogous to that of a fiduciary.26 The court
further held that as a constructive trustee the employee could be compelled
to account to the corporation for all profits realized from trading in the
stock, even though the corporation incurred no injury.21 According to
Brophy, it was no longer necessary to find evidence of traditional common
law doctrines such as usurpation of corporate opportunity28 and conflict
of interest 29 before the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the
inside trader and the corporation could be established.3 0 The decision in
Brophy was the first suggestion that the mere possession of confidential
ihformation (at least by a corporate employee) could create a fiduciary
duty to the corporation not to use the information for personal advantage.
It was Brophy that provided the New York Court of Appeals with
the common law precedent upon which to base its decision in Diamond v.
Oreamuno.8 ' Diamond was a stockholder's derivative action brought against
the president and chairman of the board of Management Assistance, Inc.
(MAI) 3 2 to compel an accounting for profits allegedly obtained by the
defendants through a violation of their fiduciary duty to the corporation.
The complaint charged that the defendants sold shares of MAI stock on
the basis of confidential information that corporate earnings would decline
sharply.33 Later, after the information was publicly disclosed, the value
of the MAI stock dropped to a price $17.00 per share lower than the
26. 31 Del. Ch. at 244, 70 A.2d at 7. The employee was a "confidential secretary"
whose duties had no relation to the corporation's decision to purchase the stock. The
court noted that such an employee would not ordinarily have fiduciary responsibilities
to the corporation. Id. at 244-45, 70 A.2d at 7.
27. Id. at 244-46, 70 A.2d at 7-8. As the employee involved was a non-officer
of the company, section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b) (1970), was inapplicable, yet Brophy has been described as "imposing a
common law liability paralleling section 16(b)." Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HAR. L. REV. 385, 409 (1953).
28. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
29. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
30. But cf. 83 HARv. L. REV. 1421, 1428 n.25 (1970), where it is argued that the
employee in Brophy was in economic competition with the corporation and that the
case could represent an application of the corporate opportunity doctrine.
31. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), aff'g 29 App. Div.
2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dep't 1968). For commentary, see 18 BUFFALO L. REV.
193 (1969); 83 HARV. L. REV. 1421 (1970) ; 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 314 (1970); 31
U. PITT. L. REV. 296 (1969); 22 VAND. L. REV. 1412 (1969); 55 VA. L. REV. 1520
(1969) ; 1970 Wis. L. REV. 576.
32. Management Assistance, Inc., financed the installation of computers through
sale and lease-back arrangements with various industrial and commercial firms. 24
N.Y.2d at 496, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 79-80.
33. Lease provisions required that MAI repair and maintain the computers.
Due to a lack of capacity, MAI was forced to turn to the manufacturer of the com-
puters, International Business Machines (IBM), to service the machines. A drastic
increase in the price charged by IBM for this work caused MAI's expenses to soar
and its net earnings to drop about 75 per cent. Id. at 496-97, 248 N.E.2d at 911,
301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
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price received by the defendants. The defendants were thus able to realize
a "profit"8 4 of $800,000 on the sale of the securities. 5 .
In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, a unanimous court held
that the officers and directors who traded on material inside information
were liable to the corporation in a shareholder's derivative action for the
gains realized from their transactions, even though the corporation suffered
no damage.8 6
The Diamond court based its holding on a number of grounds. First,
under general principles of agency and trust law an agent or trustee is not
permitted to exploit his position for profit. Confidential information was
found to be a corporate asset which could not be appropriated by corporate
fiduciaries for their own use.8 7 Relying on the New York case of Byrne
v. Barrett, s comment c to section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, 9 and Brophy,40 the court determined that the dealings of the
defendants breached their fiduciary duty and that- a derivative suit'was
the proper vehicle for recovery. Second, the court saw no difficulty with
34. The term "profit" in this context refers to the differential' between what the
defendants actually received for the stock and what they would have received if they
had sold the stock after the information was disclosed to the public. The term is,
therefore, synonymous with "avoidance of loss."
35. Id. at 497, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
36. Chief Judge Fuld stated the question presented as:[W]hether officers and directors may be held accountable to their corporation
for gains realized by them from transactions in the company's. stock as a. result
of their use of material inside information.
Id. at 496, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
37. Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
38. 268 N.Y. 199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935). In Byrne, a real .etate salesman who
had acquired confidential information in the course of his employment resigned. and
used the knowledge to consummate the transaction in his own behalf. He was held lia-
ble to his former employer for the commissions earned. The case, therefore, illustrates
the traditional common law doctrine forbidding an agent from using confidential
information to compete with his principal. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, comment c, which provides in
pertinent part:
c. Use of confidential information. An agent who acquires confidential informa-
tion in the course of his employment .. . has a duty . . . to account for any
profits made by the use of such information, although this does not harm the
principal . . . . So, if he has inside information that the corporation is about to
purchase or sell securities, or about to declare or pass a dividend, profits made
by him in stock transactions undertaken because of his knowledge are held- in
trust for the principal.
However, as more than one commentator has observed,: all the annotations to this
section contain elements of a usurpation of corporate opportunity, conflict of interest,
or some other form of injury to the principal. See 37 FoRDHAm L. REv. 477, 480
(1969) ; 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 314, 321 (1970).
40. Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31, Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949). See
text accompanying notes 25-30 supra. The Diamond court quoted from the Brophy
decision:
Public policy will not permit an employee occupying a position of trust and con-
fidence toward his employer to abuse that relationship. to his own profit, regardless
of whether his employer suffers a loss. " I
24 N.Y.2d at 501, 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 83, quoting 31 Del. Ch., at' 246,
70 A.2d at 8.
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the absence in the complaint of any allegation of corporate harm. 41 The
derivative action was not to be viewed as a compensatory remedy, but
rather as a preventative measure to remove all inducements to trading by
corporate insiders. Although damage to the corporation was not an
essential requirement, the court found that corporate injury might well
be inferred from the effect that such conduct could have on the good will
of the company and the marketability of its securities. 42 Third, the court
recognized that its decision was within the spirit of the federal securities
laws. Finding that the conduct of the defendants constituted an abuse of
a fiduciary relationship similar to that condemned by section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the federal remedies were
extremely limited in this factual situation,43 the court declared that it was
imperative that an effective common law remedy be created which would
permit corporate recovery. Finally, while acknowledging the threat of
double liability (i.e., liability both to the corporation and to those with
whom the defendants traded), the court stated that the remedies pre-
scribed by the federal securities laws were not exclusive 44 and that the
mere possibility of other suits should not preclude recovery by the
corporation.45
In Schein v. Chasen,46 the Second Circuit was compelled to apply
Florida law.4 7 However, Judge Waterman, writing for the majority, found
no Florida precedents upon which the court could rely.48 He therefore
deemed it proper for the court to look to the law of other jurisdictions
and particularly to New York where the New York Court of Appeals'
41. According to the court:
The primary concern . . . is not to determine whether the corporation has been
damaged but to decide, as between the corporation and the defendants, who has
a higher claim to the proceeds derived from the exploitation of the information.
24 N.Y.2d at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 9-10, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
42. The court quoted from Presiding Justice Botein's opinion for the Appellate
Division:
The prestige and good will of a corporation, so vital to its prosperity, may be
undermined by the revelation that its chief officers had been making personal
profits out of corporate events which they had not disclosed to the community
of stockholders.
Id. at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912-13, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 82, quoting Diamond v. Oreamuno,
29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303 (1st Dep't 1968).
43. Since neither the plaintiff-shareholder nor MAI was a party to the transac-
tions in question, they had no recourse under rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973),
because they could not satisfy the "purchaser-seller" requirement established in
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952). See notes 86 & 87 infra. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), was also inapplicable since the defendants had held
their shares longer than six months.
44. 24 N.Y.2d at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85. The court referred
to section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), which
provides in pertinent part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity .. .
45. The court suggested interpleader as a possible method of avoiding double
liability. 24 N.Y.2d at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
46. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94
S. Ct. 568 (1973).
47. See note 5 supra.
48. 478 F.2d at 821.
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decision in Diamond had wrestled with similar issues. 49 Thus the question
framed by the court was:
[WIhether the Diamond holding should extend to reach third parties
who, though not officers or directors of the injured corporation, are
involved with directors in a common enterprise to misuse confidential
corporate information for their own enrichment. 50
By answering in the affirmative, the court extended the Diamond holding5 1
- that corporate insiders who trade on confidential information must ac-
count to the corporation for their profits - to encompass outsiders whose
only affiliation with the company was that they either traded on inside
information or forwarded such information to others who did trade.
The defendants had argued that the Diamond decision was predicated
on the traditional fiduciary relationship between a corporation and its
officers and directors, and equity's longstanding disdain for fiduciaries who
use their position for personal profit.52 They contended that, as outsiders
who owed no fiduciary duty to the corporation, they were beyond the
parameters of the Diamond holding. 53 Defendants Simon and Lehman
Brothers further maintained that to hold them liable would be grossly
inequitable since they neither traded in Lum's stock nor did they profit
from the transactions of the mutual funds.54 In rejecting these arguments
the court utilized a number of theories from several different areas of law.
It is a well established principle in antitrust law that a formal agree-
ment is not necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy.5 5 Agreement
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence of business dealings and
49. The court stated:
[Olur objective is to interpret Diamond as the Florida court would probably
interpret it and to apply Diamond, as so interpreted, to the facts presented here.
Id. Judge Kaufman, in his dissenting opinion, thought the majority should have taken
advantage of Florida's certified question statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961),
which allows federal appellate courts to certify to the Florida Supreme Court ques-
tions of Florida law on which there are no definitive Florida precedents. Id. at 478
F.2d at 828-29 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
Whether or not the court should have utilized the Florida statute formed the
basis for petitions for certiorari filed by Lehman Brothers, Simon, and IDS. The
Supreme Court has consolidated the cases and granted certiorari, limiting the argument
to the following question:
Did the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit err in not certifying the
question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Florida's
certification procedure? Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec. 25.032 (1961), Fla. App. Rules,
R.4.61 (1967).
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 568 (1973).
50. 478 F.2d at 822.
51. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
52. See Brief of Appellees Simon and Lehman Bros. at 8; Brief of Appellees,
Investors Diversified Services, Inc., Investors Variable Payment Fund, Inc., and IDS
New Dimensions Fund, Inc., at 8; Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 568 (1973).
53. 478 F.2d at 822.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
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other conduct of alleged conspirators. 56 Applying this rationale to the
instant case, the court stated:
Athough there is no allegation in the complaints that a prior explicit
agreement existed between Chasen and the defendants, it is obvious
that the sequence of events detailed in the pleadings, if proved, will
substantiate the existence of a common enterprise pursuant to which
Chasen was to pass material information to Simon, Simon was to
pass it to the Mutual Funds, and the Funds were to capitalize on it
by selling Lum's stock prior to the time the material information was
announced to and was available to the public. 57
Having established that the facts alleged were sufficient to discern a
"common enterprise" to misuse confidential corporate information, the
court then examined whether the liability imposed in Diamond should
extend to the defendants. The court began its analysis by noting that it
could find nothing in the Diamond decision which suggested that "co-
venturers" of a director who has breached his corporate duty by misusing
inside information should escape liability. 8 The Diamond court had deter-
mined that damage to the goodwill and prestige of the corporation could
be inferred when a director abused his position for personal profit.5 9 In
Schein, the court found this same corporate interest to be in jeopardy.60
As long as a director divulged confidential corporate information, it made
no difference who did the actual trading, since public revelation of such
conduct could seriously injure the corporation's reputation. 61 The court
concluded that it would, therefore, defeat the purpose of Diamond to limit
its scope to corporate insiders while outside co-venturers were allowed to
escape liability.62
The majority noted Diamond's "prophylactic effect of providing a
disincentive to insider trading" 68 and felt that to absolve third parties from
56. See, e.g., Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394
U.S. 700, 704 (1969), citing Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954).
57. 478 F.2d at 822 (emphasis added). However, Judge Kaufman, dissenting,
disagreed:
[T]he facts simply do not comport with the concept of a joint enterprise, a term
which implies the existence of a prior plan to carry out a mutually beneficial
project. The complaints . . .disclose nothing more than a seemingly unsolicited
and haphazard revelation of certain information which was useful in making
investment decisions.
Id. at 827 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). For a more elaborate statement of the facts
surrounding the case, see SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-57 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
58. 478 F.2d at 822.
59. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
60. 478 F.2d at 822.
61. Id. at 822-23.
62. Id. at 823. However, it is submitted that the "corporate damage" argument
only becomes even mildly persuasive when the court attempts to balance the equities
of the litigants. Otherwise, the damage suffered is speculative and has no real rela-
tion to the trading profits sought to be recovered by the corporation.
It was not necessary for the Schein court to determine whether a cause of
action could be stated in the absence of any allegation of damage to the corporation.
One of the complaints contained a general ad damnum allegation. Id. at 824 & n.9
63. Id. at 823.
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liability to the corporation would encourage the misuse of inside informa-
tion.6 4 The court stated:
It is clear that this cleansing effect of Diamond ought to reach third
parties who, through a breach of a fiduciary relationship, become
traders advantageously possessed of confidential insider knowledge. 6'5
The majority was concerned that third parties such as the defendants
might escape liability entirely if the corporation's right to recover under
traditional fiduciary principles were not recognized. 6 Thus, by sustaining
the shareholder's derivative action, the Schein court provided a common law
remedy where remedies under federal securities laws might have proved
inadequate or unavailable.6 7 Although Judge Kaufman's dissent vigorously
attacked this "plugging the gap" rationale,68 it was justified by the majority
64. Id. To immunize such third parties might encourage corporate officials to
leak confidential information either to friends or to outsiders who might some day
return the favor. Such "implied understandings" would make it possible for a cor-
porate official to profit from the disclosure of confidential corporate information with-
out ever having traded in his company's stock. The danger of this kind of reciprocal
trading scheme was noted by the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 1301,
1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1971), wherein
a corporate insider was required to make restitution under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), and rule lOb-5 thereunder, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), for the profits derived by his tippees. The Schein decision
makes this type of conduct even less attractive by allowing the corporation to recover
such profits directly from the outside tippees through the common law derivative suit.
65. 478 F.2d at 823.
66. Id.
67. This same reasoning was used by the New York Court of Appeals in
Diamond, 24 N.Y.2d at 502-03, see note 43 and accompanying text supra. However,
at the time of the court's decision in Schein, two separate actions had been filed in
federal court charging the defendants with violations of rule lOb-5: (1) a class
action by the individual traders, Sanders v. Lum's, Inc., No. 70 Civ. 5331 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed -.-.-.---------- - ); and (2) an administrative suit brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC v. Lum's, 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). In SEC v. Lum's, decided subsequent to Schein, Lum's, Chasen, Lehman
Brothers, Simon, Sit, Jundt, and IDS entered into stipulations of settlement with
the SEC. Of the remaining defendants, the district court found that Chasen violated
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 and that his liability could be imputed to Lum's. The
court further held that Lehman Brothers was not liable for the improper conduct of
Simon since proper supervisory procedures had been taken to prevent such an
occurrence. It should be noted, however, that administrative actions by the SEC
are only brought in exceptional cases and, as the Diamond court noted, "the purpose
of such an action . . . would appear to be more to establish a principle than to
provide a regular method of enforcement." 24 N.Y.2d 494, 502. The class action suit,
Sanders v. Lum's, Inc., is still pending. However, it should be noted that class action
suits in general will be much more difficult to prosecute if the Second Circuit's recent
decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
414 U.S. 908 (1973), is affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. See note 88
infra. See note 83 infra for a discussion of the various types of suits which can be
brought in inside information cases and the Schein court's suggestion for dealing with
the attendant problem of multiple liability.
68. 478 F.2d at 827-28 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). Judge Kaufman distinguished
the policy interests underlying federal securities law from those underlying state
corporation law:
Although developments in federal securities law indicate an expanding scope of
liability for tippee traders . . . the impetus for developing this expanded federal
law liability ... is the need to maintain free and honest securities markets. This
need is given great weight when we consider claims under the federal securities
law but it is inappropriate in determining whether, under state common law,
tippee trading is a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation whose
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"[iln view of the strong desirability of tightening the law of insider
trading." 69
In extending the scope of tippee liability to include all participants
in the "common enterprise," the court relied upon section 312 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency7" and especially comment c thereunder
which provides:
A person who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating his
duty to his principal, receives confidential information from the agent,
may be enjoined from disclosing it and required to hold profits re-
ceived by its use as a constructive trustee. .... 71
Thus, reasoned the court, it was not necessary to show any pre-existing
technical fiduciary relationship with the company in order for liability to
attach. Once the material inside information was received the defendant-
tippees became corporate fiduciaries with a duty to act as constructive
trustees with respect to the confidential matter.7 2  The information was
corporate property not to be used for personal advantage and the cor-
poration, therefore, had a right to recover all profits resulting from its
use. Furthermore, the court saw no merit in the contentions of Simon
and Lehman Brothers that as non-traders it would be inequitable to hold
them liable.73 They had provided the essential connection in the scheme
to misuse the confidential information and the court found no way that
equity would be served if they were exempted from the general rule that
"the liabilities of persons engaged in a joint enterprise to commit a wrong
are both joint and several liabilities and each participant is liable to account
for the profits of the other participants. '74
shares are traded, and if so, whether such a breach is remediable through use
of a shareholders' derivative suit.
Id. (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
69. Id. at 823.
70. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958), provides:
A person who, without being privileged to do so, intentionally causes or assists
an agent to violate a duty to his principal is subject to liability to the principal.
71. 478 F.2d at 824, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312, com-
ment c, at 51 (1958).
72. 478 F.2d at 823. To further support their finding, the court cited the decisions
in Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943) and Brophy v. Cities Service
Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949). In Ohio Oil, an oil company retained the
services of a company to conduct a geophysical survey. The geophysical company
agreed not to divulge any information thus obtained without the written consent of
the oil company. However, an employee of the geophysical company communicated
the results of the survey to the defendant who, with knowledge of the confidentiality
of the information, purchased oil leases on the property for himself. The court held
that the defendant was a constructive trustee of the oil rights for the oil company.
While Ohio Oil thus demonstrates the imposition of a constructive trusteeship on
a corporate outsider, it is submitted that the case is best viewed as a logical exten-
sion of the "corporate opportunity" doctrine, see note 17 and accompanying text supra.
Although the Schein court's reliance on Brophy seems to be better founded, it should
be remembered that the defendant in Brophy, while not a technical fiduciary, was
an employee of the corporation.
73. 478 F.2d at 824. The court noted that the liability imposed on Simon and
Lehman Brothers was analogous to that imposed under federal securities laws. Id.
n.8, citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1971).
74. 478 F.2d at 824.
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The most difficult obstacle for the Schein court to overcome in finding
liability was the apparent absence of any nexus between Lum's and the
defendants. On this point the case could be easily distinguished from the
Diamond and Brophy decisions. 75 The court's inventive solution was to
characterize the pleadings before it as alleging that the defendants were
involved in a "common enterprise" with Chasen, the president of Lum's,
to misuse information for their own benefit. It was the existence of this
"common enterprise" which provided the keystone upon which the court
extended the fiduciary principles of Diamond to cover the conduct of the
defendants. It is unfortunate that because of the procedural context of the
case 7 and the court's own apparent reluctance, the opinion is barren of any
real explanation of the elements of this novel theory. The court seemingly
relied on the tort concept of "common" or "joint enterprise" in which
liability for one person's actions may be imputed to others associated with
an undertaking which has been entered into for the mutual benefit of the
parties. 77 Although this rule is founded on the law of partnership, its
application has been almost totally restricted to automobile accident cases.7 8
Thus, the court has taken a tort doctrine from automobile law, justified its
applicability to the facts in the case on the basis of antitrust principles, 79
and utilized it to dramatically extend the law of fiduciary responsibility
regarding transactions in a corporation's securities. It is submitted that the
result in Schein would be suspect if based solely on this artful exercise
in legal eclecticism. However, the court does suggest an alternative rationale
for holding the defendants liable.
Although the court employs comment c to section 312 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency as support for the imposition on the defendants
of a constructive trust regarding the confidential information,"0 liability
under section 312 is actually predicated on a third party's active solicitation
of or assistance in an agent's breach of duty owed his principal. 8' By a
75. In Diamond, liability was imposed upon directors of the corporation. See
notes 31-45 and accompanying text supra. The Brophy defendant, while not a technical
corporate fiduciary, was at least an employee. See notes 25-30 and accompanying
text supra.
76. The case was before the Second Circuit as an appeal from the grant of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See
notes 4-7 and accompanying text supra.
77. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 72 (4th ed. 1971). Although the
doctrine is surrounded by a good deal of confusion, the essential elements of a joint
enterprise are:(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group; (2) a
common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a community of pecuniary
interest in that purpose, among the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice
in the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491, comment c, at 548 (1965). See Connor v.
Southland Corp., 240 So. 2d 822 (Fla. App. 1970); Mukasey v. Aaron, 20 Utah 2d
383, 438 P.2d 702 (1968).
78. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 72 (4th ed. 1971).
79. See notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
80. See notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra.
81. See cases collected in appendix to RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 312(1958).
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strict application of this principle to the instant case the defendant-tippees
could be held liable as aiders and abettors. By trading on inside information
or conveying it to others, they would become participants in Chasen's
breach of fiduciary duty and, as such, would share the liability. On this
rationale, liability would exist independent of either a "common enterprise"
or a constructive trust theory. Furthermore, the use of this aider and
abettor theory would be consistent with recent developments in cases
arising under the federal securities laws. 8 2
The Schein decision may have a major impact on future inside in-
formation cases. The court's novel application of common law fiduciary
principles in holding outsiders liable to the corporation for trading profits
realized from the use of confidential information extends the boundaries of
tippee liability far beyond the limits heretofore known. If only for this
reason, the plight of the tippee trader is now more perilous than ever.
However, it is not only the Schein court's expansion of the scope of tippee
liability that is significant. Of equal importance is the vehicle utilized by
the court to impose this liability - the shareholders' derivative action.8
Inside information suits under the federal securities laws are normally
brought under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193484
and rule lOb-5.85 It is well recognized under what is known as the
82. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 417 F.2d 147(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). For an excellent discussion of the
various theories of liability available to the courts in this area, see Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In
Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
83. Generally, in situations where inside information is used to trade in a com-
pany's securities, four different suits may be brought based on the same facts. Actions
under the federal securities laws include: 1. an individual or class action by those
who traded without the benefit of the confidential information; 2. a suit by the com-
pany or one of its stockholders to recover so-called "short-swing" trading profits
made by company officials; and 3. an administrative suit brought by the Securities
and Exchange Commission for an injunction and the disgorgement of profits. The
fourth possible action is the common law derivative suit. See R. FROME & V. ROSEN-
ZWEIG, SALES OF SECURITIES BY CORPORATE INSIDERS (1972).
As might be expected, the existence of these various remedies causes the
possibility of multiple liability for the same acts. This question was raised by the
Schein defendants in light of the other federal actions then pending against them.
See note 67 supra. The Schein court gave very summary treatment to this issue in a
footnote, 478 F.2d 817, 825 n.10, where it was suggested that the defendants could
protect themselves from multiple liability by the method employed in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005, reh. denied, 404 U.S.
1064 (1971). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the court stated that trading profits realized
from the use of confidential information should be paid to the company "subject
to the disposition in such manner as the court might direct upon application by
the SEC or other interested party or the Court's own motion." 312 F. Supp. at 93.
Texas Gulf Sulphur was an enforcement proceeding brought for the disgorgement of
profits for the eventual benefit of innocent traders. In such a suit the recovering
corporation acts as little more than a conduit through which the liabilities of the
defendants in other actions can be satisfied. The common law derivative suit, on the
other hand, is brought for the benefit of the company. It is submitted that what the
Schein court seems to suggest is, therefore, a completely unique utilization of the
derivative suit.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
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Birnbaum doctrine8 6 that for a plaintiff to have standing to sue in such
an action, he must be either a purchaser or a seller of the securities during
the inside trading period.8 7 This requirement precludes actions by non-
trading holders of securities, either individually or as a class, to recover
profits realized by tippee traders. The Schein decision provides a common
law cause of action not subject to Birnbaum. By utilizing the derivative
suit, non-trading shareholders suing on behalf of their corporation may
now recover profits gained from a tippee's misuse of inside information.88
Thus, Schein creates a common law right of recovery where none exists
under federal law.
Timothy J. Carson
86. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952). In Birnbaum, shareholders of Newport Steel Corp. brought
an action under rule lOb-5 to recover damages from the former president of Newport
(Feldmann), the purchaser of Feldmann's charges (Wilport Co.), and others. The
plaintiffs alleged that Feldmann had breached his fiduciary duties by refusing a merger
which would have been beneficial to the company and, instead, selling his shares in
the company to Wilport Co. at a premium. The court held the plaintiff minority
shareholders to be unqualified to bring an action under rule lob-5 since they had
neither purchased nor sold the shares. The court interpreted rule lOb-5 as "having
no relation to breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders resulting in fraud upon
those who were not purchasers or sellers." Id. at 463.
87. Recent years have seen significant inroads made on the Birnbaum doctrine.
It has been criticized both by commentators, see, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the
Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968), and by
the SEC, see, e.g., Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Vine v. Beneficial Finance CO.,
374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 970 (1967). Courts. have recognized
exceptions to the purchaser-seller requirement where a non-trading plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief, see Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967),
and where, because of a merger, a plaintiff becomes a "forced seller" whose only
alternative is to exercise his appraisal right, see Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). Nevertheless, despite numerous
opportunities, the Second Circuit and most other courts have consistently refused to
repudiate Birnbaum, (see, e.g., Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1971),
rev'd and remanded en banc, 453 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1972) ; Iroquois Industries,
Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909(1970)), and they have been particularly careful not to extend the scope of rule lob-5
to give standing to an issuer, see GAF Corporation v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 721 (2d
Cir. 1971) ; General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164-65 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). It is clear, therefore, that in the
instant case Lum's had no right of action under rule lOb-5. Perhaps the present
condition of the Birnbaum doctrine is best described by Professor Loss' comment
referring to Lowenfels' article supra: "[Tlhe word 'demise' in this context does
nevertheless invoke memories of Mark Twain." L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION
3620 (Supp. 2d ed. 1969). But see Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490
F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3595 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974)
(No. 1323), wherein the Seventh Circuit abandoned the rule.
88. The use of the common law derivative suit by plaintiffs in inside information
cases was recently made even more attractive with the Second Circuit's decision in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908(1973). In Eisen, an antitrust suit for treble damages, the court established very
stringent requirements which must be met in order to bring a class action. The court
held that class action plaintiffs must bear the expense of giving notice to the class
and rejected the fluid class recovery theory. Unless it is reversed by the Supreme
Court, the Eisen decision will make many class actions, including those involving
inside information, much more difficult to prosecute. See N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1973,
at 1, col. 1.
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